TEXAS SUPREME COURT REBUFFS MENTAL ANGUISH CLAIM: This morning, the Texas Supreme Court ruled that a plaintiff could not recover mental anguish damages from her former employer who allegedly forced her roommate (a current employee of the employer) to evict her from her home. The plaintiff claimed that she was entitled to recover mental anguish damages based on a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
The court stated that it was confronted with two principal issues: (1) whether an ex-employer can be liable for forcing a current employee to evict her roommate, who was fired by the company, and (2) whether that conduct was extreme and outrageous. In this case Jackson sued Creditwatch and Quant, its chief executive officer, for causing her roommate to force her to move by threatening the roommate with firing and for lewd and other retaliatory conduct after her termination. Jackson had been fired by Creditwatch after Quant allegedly had sexually harassed her. Jackson initially sued for sexual harassment, sexual discrimination and intentional infliction of emotional distress, but withdrew the sexual harassment and discrimination claims when Creditwatch raised the statute of limitations as a defense. The trial court granted summary judgment for Creditwatch and Quant. The court of appeals reversed, holding that a fact issue remained on whether Jackson suffered severe emotional harm for the post-termination allegations.
The Supreme Court held this morning that (1) Jackson’s complaints are covered by other statutory remedies and cannot be asserted as emotional distress just because those remedies may be barred and (2) the post-termination actions were not sufficiently outrageous to constitute intentional infliction of emotional distress. Citing Hoffman-La Roche v. Zeltwanger, 144 S.W.3d 438 (Tex. 2004), the Court reiterated that intentional infliction of emotional distress is a “gap-filler” tort never intended to supplant or duplicate existing statutory or common-law remedies. Even if other remedies do not explicitly preempt the tort, their availability leaves no gap to fill. Assuming the acts alleged were independent of Jackson’s sexual harassment claims, they do not rise to the level necessary to establish the intentional infliction of emotional distress tort by extreme and outrageous character “as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency…and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.” Such claims cannot be used “to circumvent the limitations placed on the recovery of mental anguish damages under more established tort doctrines.” Creditwatch Inc. and Harold E. “Skip” Quant v. Denise Jackson (TEX.2005).